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Abstract
By using data from all available waves of the IMF Coordinated Portfolio Invest-
ment Surveys, we explore the dynamics of the determinants of bilateral portfolio
investments. The main aim of our analysis, however, is to understand whether a
diversification motive can also be found, among the various determinants. We find
strong evidence that, indeed, the correlation between the idiosyncratic components
of GDP growth, as well as the correlation between stock returns among pair of coun-
tries, that we consider as proxies for diversification, are relevant to explain bilateral
portfolio holdings, when unobserved heterogeneity is properly taken into account,
by means of a fixed effect, panel estimation (where the fixed effects refer to pair of
countries, rather than countries in isolation). Interestingly, the same results cannot
be obtained from cross section estimations. It also turns out that the diversification
motive is less relevant, if at all, in choosing whether or not to invest in a particular
area.
Keywords: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, risk sharing, gravity models
JEL codes: F210, F150, F410
1 Introduction
The objective of this work is to explore the risk sharing role of cross country portfolio
allocations. Applying a gravity model as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) on data from
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Surveys by the IMF (which reports total bilateral port-
folio investment assets), we investigate on whether investment decisions of source countries
are inspired, among the others, by risk sharing objectives. It is often claimed that the
recent surge in globalization opens up new and large opportunities for international risk
sharing. The idea is that under the hypothesis of complete markets (perfect risk sharing)
agents should invest in foreign countries with a negatively correlated business cycles, or
in those countries whose business cycles differ in volatility1. That this may or may not
have occurred is a largely empirical matter, and evidence is far from unambiguous. More-
over, there are two, equally interesting facets to this matter. Firstly, if countries were
willing to reap all the potential benefits from financial globalization, we would expect a
negative reaction of bilateral equity holdings with respect to correlations between partner
countries’ idiosyncratic components of GDP. In order to diversify risk, agents within a
country should invest in partner countries whose idiosyncratic GDP are negatively corre-
lated with national innovations to income, which would provide the investing country with
insurance against idiosyncratic risk. Secondly, even if this were the case, it should still
be checked whether or not cross-ownership of assets did bring about the desired level of
income smoothing. In this work we mainly focus on the first of the two questions, as we
try to understand whether or not countries invest more in other countries’ assets, the less
correlated their business cycle is with the partner economy. This empirical question was
also dealt with in some recent papers, namely a contribution by Portes and Rey (2005) and
another by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008); in the former, the authors analyze bilateral
portfolio equity trades in the context of a gravitational model and find weak evidence for
a role of a diversification motive as an explanatory variable, and this only after controlling
for informational frictions. The diversification motive is captured in their model by such
variables as the correlation in economies’ growth rates, stock returns and growth rates and
stock returns. In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) the authors, always in the context of
a gravitational model analyze bilateral portfolio equity holdings, and conclude that cross
country equity holdings do not seem to be driven by diversification purposes. In order to
more thoroughly explore this issue, we extend these seminal works, and especially the one
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) along several dimensions. On the one hand, we use all
the available waves of the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS in the sequel)
to perform a repeated cross section analysis, in search for time changes in the determinants
of cross ownership positions. On the other hand, we use the available data to build a panel
dataset, which helps control for individual (i.e. pair of countries) unobserved heterogeneity,
which might be not easily accounted for otherwise, and lead to possibly different results.
That this is indeed the case will be clearly seen in section 4, where the main empirical
findings will be discussed. Moreover, the explanatory variable we use to identify diversi-
fication determinants of cross ownership positions is an original one, and is derived from
the decomposition of GDP growth rates in an idiosyncratic and an aggregate component,
by means of a simple regression. The correlation in the idiosyncratic components of GDP
1Even though business cycles were perfectly synchronized is still possible to pool risk exploiting the
different volatility of the business cycles.
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growth will be used, along with other more standard variables, to investigate on this issue.
We also deal, albeit partially, with the second question, i.e., that of understanding whether
this diversification motive does bring about some benefits in the form of income smooth-
ing. By applying the methodology introduced in the seminal paper by Asdrubali et al.
(1996) we find that, indeed, those countries holding equity positions in less synchronized
host economies tend to enjoy more income smoothing by foreign assets income inflows,
although this evidence is not strong. Moreover, income smoothing seems to be enhanced
in the face of positive, rather than negative, shocks. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 frames our empirical question into the current literature, while section
3 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the main empirical
findings, while section 5 contains some final comments. The detailed description of the
variables used in the empirical analyses is relegated to the Appendix.
2 Literature review
The issue of portfolio equity investments has been dealt with, from a theoretical standpoint,
from a number of perspectives: financial market incompleteness, transactional frictions in
asset markets, and frictions in goods markets. All of these perspectives have in common
the fact that the mutual fund separation theorem does not hold, and that one normally
sees a certain amount of home bias in domestic portfolio positions. In addition, all of
these theoretical models provide some insight for the construction of empirical models of
portfolio equity investments. Previous empirical work has dealt with the geography of
investment flows, but always with some specific limits dictated by data availability. In
particular, most contributions have studied the investment positions of a single country
(most often, the United States), or of very few countries. In general, most such contribu-
tions have made use of gravity models, of the kind used in international trade analysis, to
analyze foreign direct investments and banking flows. For example, Wei (2000) and Stein
and Daude (2007) have analyzed the geography of FDI, while Buch (2002) and Rose and
Spiegel (2004) have concentrated on bank lending and borrowing. In all these papers the
role of bilateral trade as a driver of investment and the role of bank lending have been
singled out. There has also been a number of studies concentrating upon bilateral equity
investments, such as Ahearne et al. (2004), Dahlquist et al. (2003), Yildrim (2003), mostly
dealing with the case of United States, and with the issue of portfolio home bias. Two
remarkable exceptions stand out in the empirical literature on this topic, i.e. the seminal
works by Portes and Rey (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), which constitute the
most direct benchmarks for our analysis. In the seminal paper by Portes and Rey (2005),
the authors build on the theoretical work by Martin and Rey (2004), where a model of
general equilibrium with endogenous asset formation leads to a gravitational model-like
empirical specification for asset trades. Portes and Rey (2005) estimate a gravitational
model by using a novel dataset including 14 countries, for the period 1989-1996. The work
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) applies a similar gravitational model to explain bilateral
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portfolio equity holdings among a very large number of source and host countries, using
data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), run by the International
Monetary Fund. In particular, the authors use data from the second CPIS, relating to
the 2001 wave of the Survey, featuring data from 67 source and 218 host countries. The
analysis by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) departs from earlier contributions in several
noticeable ways: by resorting to a very wide pool of source and host countries, it can pro-
vide a better identification of the potential determinants of portfolio equity investments;
by developing a double fixed effects empirical specification, which consists in adding to the
empirical model two sets of country dummies, respectively for source and host countries,
which help in isolating the relative contribution of bilateral factors, source country fac-
tors and host country factors. In fact, by suitably controlling for source country and host
country effects, the role of bilateral factors can be more properly identified. Among the
other factors whose relevance was tested in their empirical work, a diversification motive
was included, but the corresponding results were inconclusive. Risk sharing and home bias
(and consequently portfolio investments) have recently been linked in the papers by Lewis
(1999), and by Sorensen et al. (2007). Absence of international portfolio diversification and
(international) risk sharing may be closely linked, as agents who diversify their portfolios
internationally are more likely to obtain smoother income and consumption. Sorensen et al.
(2007) find that home bias decreases while risk sharing increases during the 1990s. They
measure risk sharing as the distance of consumption growth from a situation of perfect
markets (perfect consumption risk sharing), and provide a measure of risk sharing income.
Both these measures show improvements, which would hint at a robust and positive corre-
lation between level of foreign portfolio assets and income risk sharing, and between foreign
direct investment (FDI) and consumption risk sharing. This issue is obviously linked to
another very “hot” topic in the recent literature: whether or not the surge in financial
liberalization that occurred in the last two decades has effectively improved on the risk
sharing opportunities available to the economies involved. The economic literature is rather
divided on this issue, and the empirical evidence is quite mixed. For example, Giannone
and Reichlin (2006) register an increase in risk sharing among European countries from the
early 1990s when market integration significantly accelerated. They also warn, however,
that estimates on selected subsamples may be affected by the subsample choice itself. Kose
et al. (2008) find very weak links between financial globalization and risk sharing, over the
period 1960-2004, and for the two subsamples 1960-1986 (pre-globalization) and 1987-2004
(globalization). In particular, they find that if globalization does not seem to have exerted
any significant impact on risk sharing for the whole sample of countries and the whole
period, it has played a negative impact on risk sharing for emerging economies. However,
on the shorter globalization sample, only developed countries seem to have reaped some
benefits from financial globalization in term of risk sharing, whereas the subset of emerging
economies does not seem to have been affected, at least in a statistically significant way.
On the other hand, Kose et al. (2006) noticed that financial openness, as measured by
gross capital flows as a ratio to GDP, is associated with an increase in the ratio of con-
sumption volatility to income volatility, contrary to the notions of improved international
risk-sharing opportunities through financial integration. Kaminsky et al. (2005) investi-
4
gate over the relationship of net income flows and GDP, and find that net capital flows
are procyclical in most OECD and developing countries, i.e. countries tend to borrow in
good times and repay in bad times. On the other hand, Bai and Zhang (2004) conduct a
regression analysis (both panel and cross section) dividing their whole sample (1973-1998)
in two distinct sub-samples (1973-1985; 1986-1998) and conducting separate tests for 19
developed countries, for 21 developing countries and for the whole set of countries. Their
study shows that, although the degree of financial integration doubles from the first to
the second sub-period, there is no substantial improvement in international risk sharing.
Moreover, they claim that international risk sharing is not sensitive to the increase in fi-
nancial integration. That the need or possibility for diversification of idiosyncratic risks
may also be a determinant for bilateral portfolio positions has surfaced in other recent
contributions, but only very few have attempted to perform an empirical verification. An
interesting work, in this field, is that by Bracke and Schmitz (2008), trying to understand
whether portfolio equity investments play a role in consumption risk sharing both via net
investment income and via capital gains. To do so, they analyze a dataset comprising 35 in-
dustrial and emerging market economies. In this paper, as anticipated in the introduction,
we intend to take one step forward, to explicitly introduce a proxy for the diversification
motive in a gravity model for bilateral portfolio investments.
3 Data
Data on bilateral equity holdings for years 2001 up to 2009 come from several waves of
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). For comparative purposes we included 67 source2 countries and 218 host countries3
as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). Original data are expressed in current US dollars.
As we are interested in the real dynamics of cross country holdings (actual purchases or
sales of assets over time), and since the overall dynamics in the value of asset holdings may
also originate from a different valuation of the same positions (both because of changes in
asset prices and in relative exchange rates), we had to compensate for the latter source of
changes. Therefore, in order to run bona fide longitudinal analyses, data on equity holdings
have been deflated by using a Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) price index
(period average, base year 2001). Likewise, the value of equity holdings of each given
country has been adjusted to account for exchange rate fluctuations by using an index
number of bilateral exchange rate between US dollars and the currency of the host country
(base year 2001). Analogously, bilateral trade across countries has been adjusted for ex-
change rate fluctuations. As a result of all these adjustments, equity values are expressed
in 2001 current US dollars, at 2001 stock prices. Covariates have been computed following
2See appendix A for a complete list of source and host countries included in the analysis.
3Source refers to countries undertaking an investment, i.e. purchasing equities in a foreign country,
while hosts refers to countries receiving the investment.
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Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).4 In tables 1, 2 and 3 we report percentage shares and
the growth rates of bilateral equity asset holdings (unweighted and weighted5) aggregating
over 6 major areas. Data are, as explained in the previous section, in “constant, 2001,
terms” since they are adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations and for valuation effects.
Offshore centers have been removed, to avoid distortions. Thus, statistics in table 1, 2
and 3 refer to the dependent variable entering our regression analysis. Over the period
2001-2009 the weight of OECD countries is still dominant, since around 74 percent of the
total amount of equity asset holding is due to U.S., UK and Euro Area; however, their
role is becoming less important over the observed period of time. In particular, the U.S.
and the Euro Area lost respectively about 5 and 2.5 percent of their shares, while UK
lost just 0.9 percent. On the contrary, Japan gained one percentage point, other OECD
countries and Emerging markets registered a remarkable increase of their weight of around
4 percent. A quick look at unweighted rates of growth of equity asset holdings reveals how
Emerging markets quadrupled their international portfolio size, “other OECD countries”
and Japan doubled, whereas U.S., UK and the Euro Area have been growing below the
average, increasing their equity assets positions by around 50 percent. If we now look at
weighted rates of growth (by the corresponding percentage shares of the total, reported
in table 3), about half of the increase in total investment can be attributed to emerging
markets and to “other OECD countries”. To sum up, total growth of equity asset holdings
amounts to 76.2 percent and the increasing role of emerging economies and the attractive-
ness of U.S. and European markets for these countries become quite evident. Moreover,
the persistence of bilateral investment patterns decreased somehow over the whole time
horizon in comparison to what detected by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) between 2001
and 2005.6It seems fair to say that, looking at data, there is some evidence of an ongoing
change of the international investment patterns, calling for a further investigation over the
entire available time horizon.
4 Empirical findings
This section describes the results for cross-section and panel analyses. Cross section anal-
yses have been conducted, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), controlling for countries’
characteristics by the inclusion of “double fixed effects” for source and host countries,
whereas our panel analysis includes individual fixed effects for each pair of source-host
countries, which is less restrictive and allows controlling for specific “pair” effects. The
combination of any two countries, in fact, might be influenced by a fixed factor which is
potentially different from the combination of the two individual countries effects. Following
4For a detailed description of data see appendix B.
5By period average shares.
6If one regresses, as in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the log of equity positions in 2001 on the log of
equity positions in 2005, one obtains an elasticity of 0.84, while the same exercise between 2001 and 2009
yields an elasticity of about 0.73.
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Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), the estimated model for cross section analyses is:
log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij (1)
where xij is the portfolio equity holdings of country i in country j; Zij is a vector of
covariates; φi and φj are dummy variables for source and host countries, respectively.
This model includes a dummy variable for each source and each host country, so that the
constant is given by the sum of φi and φj, capturing individual heterogeneity of countries i
and j. The strength and the novelty of this approach is that it allows exploiting the bilateral
dimension of the data to take into account nationals’ characteristics. However, once we have
several cross sections, corresponding to various time periods, the time dimension can also
be used, allowing for the inclusion of proper individual fixed effects, where by individuals
we mean source-host pairs of countries. The inclusion of “pairs fixed effects” allows to
capture that heterogeneity which characterizes any bilateral portfolio equity allocations.
This is more general than in the cross section estimation, imposing each country’s fixed
effect to be identical irrespective of the partner country (host or source). In terms of
number of dummy variables to be estimated, in the more restrictive model a total of i+j
individual dummies is to be estimated, while in the panel estimation i · j individual fixed
effects are included. Therefore, for the panel analysis we adopt the following fixed effects
model specification:
log(xijt) = φij + νt + βZijt + ijt (2)
where φij are individual intercepts and νt are time fixed effects.
4.1 Cross section analysis
For comparative purposes, the first step of our analysis consists in replicating the empirical
evidence offered by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for the year 2001 and its extension for
the whole available sampling period, i.e. 2002-2009, in order to assess possible changes over
time in the determinants of international asset allocation choices of responding countries
(results available upon request). The estimation results, presented in tables 5-12 essentially
confirm those presented in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008): throughout the years, bilateral
trade is the single most important explanatory variable of cross country portfolio holdings,
though its relevance is much weakened in the Tobit estimation. Other variables proxying
for information asymmetries and sociocultural proximity are more or less significant in
explaining portfolio holdings, over the years: the logarithm of distance, of time difference,
and various dummies for common language, ex colonial past, for being party in a tax treaty,
or in a currency union. The variables used to identify a diversification motive for portfolio
cross holdings are often significant, but with the “wrong”, positive, sign. Their estimated
coefficients seem to indicate that agents hold portfolios in countries which are rather sim-
ilar, in terms of business cycle dynamics and stock markets. We also introduced some
additional explanatory variables. In particular, we replaced the variable expressing the
correlation between GDP growths with a different one, containing the correlation among
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the idiosyncratic components of GDP growth. Details about the computation of this vari-
able can be found in the data appendix. The estimated coefficient of this variable is also
positive, and does not bring new elements into the picture. One more explanatory variable
is worth mentioning, the overall score of freedom in the host country, produced by The
Heritage Foundation7. It always enters with a positive and significant coefficient across all
estimation periods for the full sample and the OECD set, while it gains importance and
significance for emerging economies as we move towards the end of the time horizon (2009,
though, seems to be an exception). Tables 13-15 give an idea of the variability across years
of estimated coefficients of just one particular specification of equation (1), namely the
specification reported in columns (1) of tables 4-12; a cursory reading of these tables show
that, for the whole sample of countries, the coefficients of the most important explanatory
variable, bilateral trade, increases in magnitude over the whole sample, though non mono-
tonically. The relevance of the other significant variables, i.e. time difference, common
language, colonial past, common legal origin and the overall score of freedom in the host
country, significantly varies across periods, but at the end of the time horizon is not very
different from what it was at the beginning. As for the OECD countries, the relevance
of the bilateral trade has an opposite behavior (i.e. decreases over time). The estimated
models for the emerging countries are the ones yielding the less satisfactory results, with
many explanatory variables being only occasionally significant.
4.2 Panel analysis
The estimation results change in a remarkable way as we move to a proper panel esti-
mation. As is well known, in the context of panel estimations it is possible to properly
assess the relevance of fixed effects, i.e. the impact of factors which are peculiar to the
individual observations. In our case each observation concerns a pair (source-host) of
countries, and the fixed effect refers to some factor which plays a role for this couple,
but not necessarily for each economy in isolation. Therefore, any fixed effect is likely to
capture the (possibly stable) effect of variables which are relevant for the interaction of
those economies, and which cannot be observed or are difficult to quantify. It is highly
plausible that such unaccounted for factors be somehow correlated with our proxies for
diversification motives (correlations between stock market returns, or correlation between
idiosyncratic components of GDP). This unobserved factors may then have an impact on
the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients of the latter, if the former become
part of the disturbance term, as is likely to be the case in purely cross sectional estima-
tions. As already hinted at above, simple source and host country effects, which were
included in the cross sectional estimations, may not adequately account for such factors.
We report in table 16 panel estimates over the period 2001-2009 for the whole sample and
the two subsamples (OECD countries and Emerging economies). We may immediately
observe that, as this specification includes both period and cross section fixed effects, all
the variables not (sufficiently) changing over time cannot be included, their effect being
7http://www.heritage.org/
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somehow summarized in the cross section fixed effects. While the effect of bilateral trade
is almost always strong and positive, and the overall level of freedom in the host country is
always positively significant, as it was the case in the cross section and pooled cross section
estimations, our original research question receives a more clear cut answer. In almost all
model specifications both the correlation between the idiosyncratic components of GDP
and the correlation in stock returns turned out to be significantly negative. Interestingly,
even in the face of a positive correlation between the two variables, they are both signifi-
cant, suggesting that the comovements between the idiosyncratic components of GDP are
significant even if one controls for the correlation between stock returns in two economies.
This is true both for the linear specifications and for the non linear, Tobit specification
(but only for the correlation in the idiosyncratic components of GDP). When we look at
the results for the two subsamples, however, the diversification motive is supported by the
linear specification, but not by the Tobit model. This suggests that the decision to engage
in portfolio investments, and that of investing more or less, might have different determi-
nants relative to the subsamples. In particular, it seems that the former depends more
on the closeness and similarity of the pair of economies, although it may well be the case
that once the decision to open a position in a country is taken, the investment size may
also be determined by diversification motives. This is confirmed by the regression results
of the corresponding probit models (column 6 of table 16), where one of the diversification
variables, namely the correlation in stock returns, has a positive and significant coefficient.
We get a different result with the tax treaty variable. The fact that a pair of countries are
taking part in a tax treaty appears to be significant in determining the choice of investing,
but not to have an impact upon the relative dimension of portfolio investments. That
diversification may have opposite effects on the choice of investing and on the correspond-
ing amounts is somehow reminiscent of the discussion of the empirical results in Portes
and Rey (2005), where the authors observe that the variables proxying for a diversification
motive enter with a positive sign if they do not control for information frictions (above all,
distance), whereas the sign becomes (weakly) negative when such factors are controlled
for. In our panel estimations information frictions should be captured by the pair fixed
effects, and the larger dataset (and possibly the different estimation horizon) allows us to
better identify a diversification motive at work.
4.3 Business cycle desynchronization and risk sharing
In the previous paragraphs we found that the correlation between the idiosyncratic com-
ponents of GDP growth plays a non negligible role in driving the cross-border allocation
of investments in the global stock market. On the other hand, the existence of differences
among national business cycles opens the way to insurance possibilities which can be ex-
ploited to reduce the longitudinal variance of national income, thus increasing national
welfares. Up to this point we have been able to identify a diversification motive as a
determinant of portfolio choices. However, this does not necessarily entail that portfolio
allocations have been effective in insuring countries against bad states of nature. Therefore,
as the last step of our analysis, we measure the degree of risk sharing achieved through
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equity purchases on foreign stock markets. Foreign equities held by residents generate an
income that adds to their disposable income and is recorded in the current account of the
balance of payments. It is therefore possible to assess the degree of income smoothing
brought about by the holding of foreign equities (for a detailed explanation of the method-
ology see Appendix C). The analysis has been conducted separately for the set of countries
adhering to the European Monetary Union (EMU) and for the set of OECD countries. As
a first step we have computed a measure of lack of (potentially exploitable) risk sharing
opportunities, given by the (weighted) mean correlation of idiosyncratic GDP growth of
a given source country with idiosyncratic GDP growth of all its host countries. Next, we
have computed, for each country of the group, the degree of risk sharing achieved through
foreign equity holdings, by using the methodology illustrated in Appendix C. Table 17 con-
tains the values taken by these two variables for the various countries, as well as various
indices of correlations between them. All in all, if we consider all (positive and negative)
shocks, our priors are weakly confirmed in the case of EMU countries (significance values
of correlations in the range 0.20-0.25), while they should be strongly rejected for the set of
OECD countries. Notwithstanding, if we distinguish among positive and negative shocks,
we obtain a somewhat neater picture. Indeed, for EMU countries correlations are strongly
significant (significance values in the range 0.01-0.02) in the case of positive shocks, while
they are not significant at all in the case of negative shocks. In other words, equity holdings
in less ”synchronized” economies help smooth income peaks associated to good states of
nature, while they do not seem effective in smoothing income troughs experienced during
bad states of nature. However, by directly looking at the values of mean correlations and
percentages of income smoothing for the various countries we realize that, despite a non
significant negative correlation, the widest percentages of income smoothing in the face of
negative shocks via portfolio equity holdings are obtained by those countries featuring a
low (under 0.20) mean correlation in the dynamics of idiosyncratic GDP growth.
5 Conclusions
The recent surge in financial globalization opened up many investment opportunities for
the countries involved. One possible outcome of this process is an increase in portfolio
diversification, if bilateral holdings are also driven by diversification motives. Whether
or not this has been the case is the research question addressed in this paper, where we
extend the analysis proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) to all available waves of
the IMF Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey; this question is addressed by means of
both cross section and panel methodologies. The main empirical result of our analysis is
that, indeed, a diversification motive emerges from the data, which mainly concerns the
relative size of portfolio holdings. It also turns out, however, that the decision to open
portfolio positions in a country depends more on symmetries, rather than differences, in
the two countries’ cycles.
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6 Appendix A
List of source countries excluding offshore centers:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Ko-
rea (Republic of), Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
List of host countries excluding offshore centers:
Albania, Algeria, American Samoa, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azer-
baijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia,
Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia,
Comoros, Congo (Democratic Republic of), Congo (Republic of), Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Faroe Islands, Fiji, Finland, France,
French Guiana, French Polynesia, French Southern Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Greenland, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (Democratic People’s Re-
public of), Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania,
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Por-
tugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino, Sa˜o Tome`
and Pr`ıncipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Helena, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, United States Minor Outlying
Islands, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vatican City State, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands
(United States), Wallis and Futuna Islands, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Yemen, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
7 Appendix B
Bilateral portfolio equity holdings:
millions of U.S. dollar of portfolio equity holdings issued by host countries and held by
source country. Source 2001-2009 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey.
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Bilateral trade:
five-year backward looking moving average of imports plus exports over the period 2001-
2009. Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
Colony Dummy:
dummy taking the value 1 if source and host country ever had a colonial relationship and
zero otherwise. Source Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Common Language:
dummy variable taking value 1 if host and source countries share the same language and
zero otherwise. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Common Legal Origin:
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the source and and host countries have a legal system
with a common origin (common law, French, German or Scandinavian) and 0 otherwise.
Source: Porta et al. (2005) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008).
Correlation between growth-stock returns:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between annual GDP growth
rates in the source country and real stock returns in the host country over the period 2001-
2009. For the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has
been restricted to just ten years. Source: authors’ calculation based on Morgan Stanley
Capital International (Datastream) and World Bank (on-line database World Development
Indicators).
Correlation in GDP growth rates:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between the annual GDP
growth rate of source and host countries over the period 2001-2009. For the IV estimation
the aforementioned backward looking moving average has been restricted to just ten years.
Source: authors’ calculation based on World Bank (on-line database: World Development
Indicators).
Correlation in idiosyncratic GDP:
twenty one-year backward looking moving average correlation between the annual idiosyn-
cratic GDP growth rate of source and host countries over the period 2001-2009. For the
IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has been restricted
to just ten years. The idiosyncratic component of GDP growth is computed as the esti-
mated residuals of the following regression ∆ log(GDPit) = β∆ log(GDPat) + it. Where
∆ log(GDPit) is the country i GDP rate of growth and ∆ log(GDPat) represents the aver-
age rate of growth of the reference group (in our case: all countries; OECD countries and
Emerging Markets). The GDP growth rate of a given country is therefore decomposed in
two orthogonal components: in fact, ∆ log(GDPit) = β̂∆ log(GDPat) + eit, thus the id-
iosyncratic GDP growth will be orthogonal to the aggregate (group average) GDP growth
by construction: eit⊥β̂∆ log(GDPat). The more standard practice (e.g. Asdrubali et al.
(1996)) consists in simply subtracting the group average GDP growth to each country’ s
GDP rate of growth. However, this practice does not guarantee orthogonality between
aggregate and idiosyncratic GDP growth and may generate serious omitted variable bias
if one of the regressors strongly correlates with the aggregate GDP growth. Moreover the
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standard decomposition restricts the coefficient attached to aggregate GDP to be equal to
1, while the empirical evidence contradicts this assumption.
Correlation in stock returns:
eleven-year backward looking moving average correlation between the monthly stock mar-
ket returns of the host and source country, expressed in U.S. dollars over the period 2001-
2009. For the IV estimation the aforementioned backward looking moving average has
been restricted to just five years. Source: authors’ calculations based on returns data from
Morgan Stanley Capital International (Datastream).
Currency Union Dummy:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries are in a currency union and
zero otherwise. Source Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004)
Log distance:
logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of source and host
country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).
Overall score of freedom in the host country:
overall freedom score ranging from zero to 100 given by the average of ten component
scores: business freedom; trade freedom; fiscal freedom; Government spending; monetary
freedom; investment freedom; financial freedom; property rights; freedom from corruption;
labour freedom. All 10 components are weighted equally. Source The Heritage Foundation
(http://www.heritage.org/)
Tax Treaty:
dummy variable taking value 1 if source and host countries enacted a double taxation agree-
ment prior to 1999. Agreements considered are: Capital, Income and Capital, Income and
Inheritance. Double taxation agreements on Air, Land and Sea Transport have been ex-
cluded. Source: Authors’ elaborations on DTT (Double Taxation Treaties) database from
www.unctad.org.
Time Difference:
absolute value of of time difference between host and source country (from 1 to 12). Source:
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and Rose and Spiegel (2004)
8 Appendix C
In the analysis reported in table (17), applying a time series counterpart of the variance
decomposition first introduced by Asdrubali et al. (1996), we computed the percentage of
risk sharing achieved through financial asset income inflows (sub-component of the factor
income) as in Balli et al. (2011). Thus, for each country of the two groups considered
(OECD and EMU countries), we estimated the following equation obtaining the percentage
of income smoothing achieved by income inflows deriving from financial assets holding by
each single country.
˜∆ logGDPINt = β+f ˜∆ logGDPt + t
where:
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GDPINt = (GDP+financial assets income inflows);˜∆ logGDPINt = (∆ logGDPINt −∆ logGDPINat );˜∆ logGDPt = (∆ logGDPt −∆ logGDP at );
∆ logGDPINat and ∆ logGDP
a
t are group averages. 1 − β+f is the percentage of income
smoothing achieved through the portfolio equity holdings channel (inflows). We then dis-
tinguished between positive and negative idiosyncratic shocks, identifying positive shocks
as those corresponding to periods of positive output gap8. This allows to estimate the
smoothing role of assets income inflows in the face of asymmetries in shocks.
˜∆ logGDPINt = β+f1 ˜∆ logGDPt+ + β+f2 ˜∆ logGDPt− + t
where 1 − β+f1 is the percentage of risk sharing with respect to positive shocks, while
1 − β+f2 is the same measure in response to negative shocks. The data span is from 1980
to 2009 (annual frequency). Source: International Monetary Fund (Balance of Payments
Statistics).
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Table 1: International Equity Asset Holdings
(% shares over the year-total)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001-2009
United States 0.0 7.3 9.4 5.7 5.4 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.7 0.0 3.7 1.6 1.0 1.4 12.5
Euro area 9.2 3.8 9.9 1.5 1.7 1.1 27.3
Japan 3.5 0.6 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.3 5.6
Other OECD Countries 8.9 1.8 3.1 1.2 1.0 0.7 16.7
Emerging markets 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.2 4.5
Total 27.8 14.7 27.3 10.3 9.6 10.3 100.0
2001
United States - 8.8 11.5 4.3 6.2 5.0 35.7
United Kingdom 3.2 - 5.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 12.9
Euro area 8.1 4.2 11.2 1.1 2.2 1.1 27.9
Japan 3.1 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.3
Other OECD Countries 7.2 1.8 3.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 15.2
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.0
Total 22.4 16.6 32.9 7.7 11.3 9.1 100.0
2002
United States - 8.2 10.6 4.9 6.1 4.7 34.5
United Kingdom 4.0 - 4.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 12.8
Euro area 8.2 4.5 11.2 1.3 2.2 0.9 28.3
Japan 3.2 0.7 0.9 - 0.4 0.2 5.4
Other OECD Countries 7.8 1.9 3.3 1.1 1.1 0.6 15.8
Emerging markets 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.7 3.1
Total 24.0 16.4 30.7 9.0 11.4 8.4 100.0
2003
United States - 8.1 10.0 5.6 5.9 5.6 35.3
United Kingdom 3.9 - 3.6 1.6 1.0 1.5 11.5
Euro area 9.1 4.1 11.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 29.0
Japan 3.2 0.6 0.8 - 0.3 0.2 5.2
Other OECD Countries 7.9 1.8 3.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 15.8
Emerging Countries 0.8 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 3.2
Total 24.9 15.7 29.3 10.0 10.2 10.0 100.0
2004
United States - 6.8 10.1 5.6 5.5 5.5 33.4
United Kingdom 4.5 - 4.2 1.6 0.8 1.6 12.7
Euro area 9.6 3.7 11.0 1.7 1.7 1.1 28.8
Japan 3.7 0.7 0.8 - 0.4 0.3 5.8
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 3.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 15.8
Emerging markets 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.9 3.6
Total 27.1 14.0 29.4 10.2 9.3 10.0 100.0
2005
United States - 6.7 9.3 7.3 5.5 5.8 34.7
United Kingdom 5.0 - 3.5 2.1 1.0 1.4 13.1
Euro area 9.4 3.5 9.7 2.0 1.7 1.2 27.4
Japan 3.6 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.3 5.4
Other OECD Countries 8.3 1.6 2.8 1.4 0.8 0.6 15.5
Emerging markets 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.1 3.9
Total 27.3 13.5 26.4 13.1 9.3 10.4 100.0
2006
United States - 6.5 9.3 6.2 5.1 6.0 33.1
United Kingdom 5.4 - 3.3 1.9 0.9 1.4 13.0
Euro area 10.0 3.6 9.9 2.0 1.6 1.3 28.5
Japan 3.4 0.5 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.3
Other OECD Countries 8.4 1.6 2.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 15.8
Emerging markets 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.5 4.3
Total 28.7 13.1 26.4 11.5 8.9 11.4 100.0
2007
United States - 6.0 9.0 6.5 5.1 6.3 32.9
United Kingdom 5.4 - 2.8 1.8 0.8 1.5 12.4
Euro area 9.8 3.2 8.5 1.8 1.5 1.4 26.1
Japan 3.3 0.4 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 5.2
Other OECD Countries 9.9 1.6 3.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 17.8
Emerging markets 1.9 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.1 1.8 5.6
Total 30.4 12.1 24.4 11.9 8.8 12.4 100.0
2008
United States - 6.4 7.9 6.8 4.7 5.0 30.8
United Kingdom 5.9 - 2.9 1.6 0.7 1.2 12.2
Euro area 10.1 3.4 8.1 0.9 1.4 0.8 24.7
Japan 4.2 0.6 0.7 - 0.3 0.4 6.2
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.0 2.9 1.5 1.0 0.8 19.5
Emerging markets 2.5 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 1.7 6.6
Total 34.0 13.8 22.8 11.3 8.2 9.8 100.0
2009
United States - 8.2 7.4 4.3 4.9 5.8 30.6
United Kingdom 5.3 - 3.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 12.0
Euro area 8.9 3.9 8.4 0.9 1.3 1.3 24.7
Japan 4.1 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 6.3
Other OECD Countries 10.5 2.6 3.1 1.1 1.2 0.9 19.5
Emerging markets 2.4 2.0 0.7 0.3 0.1 1.4 6.9
Total 31.3 17.5 23.4 7.9 9.0 11.0 100.0
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Table 2: International Equity Asset Holdings
(annual % changes unweighted)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001/2009, total change
United States - 65.5 12.6 76.7 40.1 103.8 50.8
United Kingdom 189.5 - -3.2 70.3 41.8 58.3 63.8
Euro area 95.5 63.8 32.2 44.9 1.4 93.3 55.8
Japan 132.7 68.1 51.9 - 82.2 228.4 110.9
Other OECD Countries 155.7 152.8 57.0 115.7 108.5 130.8 125.8
Emerging markets 430.2 234.0 421.7 385.9 107.7 274.2 312.3
Total 145.6 85.4 25.2 79.6 40.8 113.5 76.2
2001/2002
United States - -4.7 -6.1 17.3 1.4 -4.3 -1.4
United Kingdom 25.5 - -19.6 21.8 8.6 3.4 1.4
Euro area 3.8 8.7 2.4 18.1 1.1 -21.2 3.3
Japan 6.3 -0.2 2.4 - 5.9 -8.1 4.1
Other OECD Countries 10.3 6.6 -5.6 21.8 7.4 -8.4 5.8
Emerging markets -4.8 6.2 53.7 42.4 1.5 1.9 7.1
Total 9.1 0.8 -4.8 19.0 2.9 -5.3 1.9
2002/2003
United States - 32.6 27.5 53.4 30.4 60.9 37.4
United Kingdom 32.6 - 7.6 33.7 -9.9 47.0 20.7
Euro area 49.2 21.2 35.8 59.7 12.8 77.7 38.0
Japan 34.4 17.5 20.4 - 15.5 59.5 29.5
Other OECD Countries 35.4 26.0 37.2 40.2 19.1 55.3 34.6
Emerging markets 40.3 36.2 10.2 45.0 1.0 59.0 38.5
Total 39.7 28.3 28.3 49.2 19.9 59.8 34.6
2003/2004
United States - -22.8 -7.9 -8.0 -15.1 -10.1 -12.9
United Kingdom 5.0 - 8.3 -7.3 -25.7 0.6 1.1
Euro area -3.2 -15.4 -10.6 0.7 -14.6 -13.7 -8.7
Japan 5.6 -4.4 -3.7 - 0.1 20.6 3.3
Other OECD Countries -2.6 -15.3 -13.2 -6.4 -17.7 -15.7 -8.0
Emerging markets 16.1 -1.0 -23.3 1.1 -7.3 3.4 2.2
Total 0.0 -17.7 -7.6 -6.2 -15.7 -7.5 -8.0
2004/2005
United States - 5.4 -1.8 39.0 5.7 13.4 10.3
United Kingdom 18.3 - -10.0 43.2 29.5 -6.8 9.6
Euro area 4.4 -0.9 -6.3 26.5 1.8 11.4 1.1
Japan 2.2 -19.9 -2.5 - 0.6 -1.7 -1.2
Other OECD Countries 5.0 5.8 -5.2 28.9 2.2 3.7 4.6
Emerging markets 15.5 3.9 23.5 48.2 -12.1 31.9 17.3
Total 7.0 2.5 -4.8 36.6 6.4 10.5 6.2
2005/2006
United States - 6.9 11.0 -6.8 2.7 14.2 5.7
United Kingdom 20.5 - 3.7 0.1 4.3 10.9 10.4
Euro area 18.1 14.4 13.5 8.7 8.0 25.4 15.0
Japan 7.0 12.5 6.7 - 5.8 41.4 9.2
Other OECD Countries 12.6 10.3 13.3 -0.1 21.6 34.6 12.7
Emerging markets 39.9 -16.4 10.6 -14.3 35.0 48.9 20.3
Total 16.3 7.5 11.1 -2.7 5.8 20.7 10.7
2006/2007
United States - -17.1 -12.8 -4.5 -9.0 -5.5 -10.2
United Kingdom -9.5 - -23.6 -15.3 -19.0 -2.2 -13.8
Euro area -11.6 -20.7 -22.9 -19.0 -17.2 -1.8 -17.1
Japan -12.3 -20.7 -15.4 - -12.8 10.6 -12.0
Other OECD Countries 6.6 -8.5 -4.0 3.3 -6.4 0.8 1.9
Emerging markets 29.8 -5.1 38.3 70.3 53.5 7.8 17.6
Total -4.0 -16.4 -16.5 -6.8 -10.9 -2.0 -9.6
2007/2008
United States - -26.2 -39.8 -28.6 -36.6 -45.3 -35.7
United Kingdom -26.0 - -30.2 -38.6 -38.4 -47.1 -32.2
Euro area -29.1 -25.4 -34.5 -64.2 -37.2 -63.3 -35.1
Japan -13.6 -6.2 -30.0 - -29.6 -42.8 -18.5
Other OECD Countries -21.6 -16.3 -35.1 -24.7 -27.8 -38.5 -24.8
Emerging markets -12.6 4.5 -33.6 -8.0 -28.5 -33.9 -18.3
Total -23.3 -21.6 -35.9 -34.4 -35.6 -45.4 -31.3
2008/2009
United States - 145.9 78.5 21.0 98.9 120.0 89.8
United Kingdom 73.6 - 107.2 51.2 189.9 93.5 87.4
Euro area 68.7 119.3 97.9 91.3 82.1 218.2 91.5
Japan 86.0 123.9 107.8 - 128.0 111.4 95.8
Other OECD Countries 77.6 148.6 108.5 34.7 135.8 122.6 90.8
Emerging markets 86.6 170.9 219.7 17.0 67.7 59.7 100.7
Total 76.0 141.3 96.2 32.8 109.4 113.7 91.2
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Table 3: International Equity Asset Holdings
(annual % changes weighted by the share)
Source / Host Usa Uk Euro Japan Other
OECD
Emerging
markets
Total
2001/2009
United States - 5.7 1.4 3.3 2.5 5.2 18.1
United Kingdom 6.1 - -0.2 0.9 0.6 0.8 8.2
Euro area 7.7 2.7 3.6 0.5 0.0 1.1 15.6
Japan 4.1 0.5 0.4 - 0.3 0.5 5.9
Other OECD Countries 11.3 2.8 2.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 19.1
Emerging Countries 3.5 2.5 1.0 0.4 0.1 1.8 9.3
Total 32.7 14.2 8.3 6.1 4.6 10.3 76.2
2001/2002
United States - -0.4 -0.7 0.7 0.1 -0.2 -0.5
United Kingdom 0.8 - -1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.2
Euro area 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.9
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries 0.7 0.1 -0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.9
Emerging Countries 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Total 2.0 0.1 -1.6 1.5 0.3 -0.5 1.9
2002/2003
United States - 2.7 2.9 2.6 1.9 2.9 12.9
United Kingdom 1.3 - 0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.6 2.7
Euro area 4.0 1.0 4.0 0.8 0.3 0.7 10.8
Japan 1.1 0.1 0.2 - 0.1 0.1 1.6
Other OECD Countries 2.8 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 5.5
Emerging Countries 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 1.2
Total 9.5 4.6 8.7 4.4 2.3 5.0 34.6
2003/2004
United States - -1.8 -0.8 -0.4 -0.9 -0.6 -4.5
United Kingdom 0.2 - 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.1
Euro area -0.3 -0.6 -1.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -2.5
Japan 0.2 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.2
Other OECD Countries -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -1.3
Emerging Countries 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 0.0 -2.8 -2.2 -0.6 -1.6 -0.8 -8.0
2004/2005
United States - 0.4 -0.2 2.2 0.3 0.7 3.4
United Kingdom 0.8 - -0.4 0.7 0.2 -0.1 1.2
Euro area 0.4 0.0 -0.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.3
Japan 0.1 -0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Other OECD Countries 0.4 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.7
Emerging Countries 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.6
Total 1.9 0.3 -1.4 3.7 0.6 1.1 6.2
2005/2006
United States - 0.5 1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.8 2.0
United Kingdom 1.0 - 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4
Euro area 1.7 0.5 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 4.1
Japan 0.2 0.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.5
Other OECD Countries 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.2 2.0
Emerging Countries 0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.8
Total 4.4 1.0 2.9 -0.4 0.5 2.2 10.7
2006/2007
United States - -1.1 -1.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 -3.4
United Kingdom -0.5 - -0.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -1.8
Euro area -1.2 -0.7 -2.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 -4.9
Japan -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 - 0.0 0.0 -0.6
Other OECD Countries 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.3
Emerging Countries 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8
Total -1.1 -2.1 -4.4 -0.8 -1.0 -0.2 -9.6
2007/2008
United States - -1.6 -3.6 -1.9 -1.9 -2.9 -11.7
United Kingdom -1.4 - -0.8 -0.7 -0.3 -0.7 -4.0
Euro area -2.9 -0.8 -2.9 -1.1 -0.5 -0.9 -9.2
Japan -0.5 0.0 -0.2 - -0.1 -0.2 -1.0
Other OECD Countries -2.1 -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -4.4
Emerging Countries -0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -1.0
Total -7.1 -2.6 -8.8 -4.1 -3.1 -5.6 -31.3
2008/2009
United States - 9.3 6.2 1.4 4.7 6.0 27.6
United Kingdom 4.3 - 3.1 0.8 1.4 1.1 10.7
Euro area 7.0 4.1 7.9 0.9 1.1 1.7 22.6
Japan 3.6 0.7 0.7 - 0.4 0.4 5.9
Other OECD Countries 8.8 3.0 3.1 0.5 1.3 1.0 17.7
Emerging Countries 2.1 2.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 1.0 6.7
Total 25.8 19.6 21.9 3.7 9.0 11.2 91.2
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Table 4: Year 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3306*** 0.6235*** 0.0242 0.1035**
(0.099) (0.108) (0.038) (0.051)
Log distance -0.1734 -0.8395*** -0.6646***
(0.150) (0.078) (0.085)
Time difference -0.0502* 0.0847*** 0.0141
(0.028) (0.015) (0.017)
Common language 0.3713** 0.1739 0.1947** 0.4491***
(0.174) (0.175) (0.098) (0.106)
Colony dummy 0.4653* 0.5808** 0.2257 0.4550***
(0.267) (0.266) (0.165) (0.164)
Tax treaty 0.0335 0.0768 -0.1179 -0.0880
(0.132) (0.132) (0.081) (0.085)
Currency union dummy 0.1190 -0.1251 0.7517*** 0.1726
(0.224) (0.229) (0.165) (0.158)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.1896 0.3788* 0.0701 0.3340***
(0.207) (0.203) (0.118) (0.127)
Correl. in stock returns 2.6284*** 3.7279***
(0.593) (0.795)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.5543** -0.2242
(0.221) (0.912)
Common legal origin 0.2208* -0.0739
(0.129) (0.130)
Freedom in the host country 0.1574*** 0.1517*** 0.1468*** 0.1727***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant -9.3853*** -13.5887*** -2.3249*** -5.0212***
(1.521) (1.105) (0.826) (0.915)
Observations 861 713 1,702 1,702
R-squared 0.878 0.891 0.795 0.505
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.4168*** 0.3868*** -0.0279 0.1266**
(0.094) (0.079) (0.036) (0.050)
Log distance 0.1051 -0.5228*** -0.3962***
(0.146) (0.079) (0.093)
Time difference -0.0229 0.0275* 0.0150
(0.027) (0.015) (0.018)
Common language 0.4734*** 0.2334 0.2982*** 0.3928***
(0.166) (0.152) (0.089) (0.107)
Colony dummy 0.0609 0.2981 0.3435** 0.3942**
(0.251) (0.227) (0.139) (0.159)
Tax treaty -0.1320 -0.0559 -0.1975*** -0.1904**
(0.127) (0.113) (0.072) (0.084)
Currency union dummy 0.5246*** 0.3839* 0.1844 0.2166
(0.201) (0.198) (0.137) (0.146)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1890 0.0065 0.0289 0.0206
(0.199) (0.179) (0.110) (0.131)
Correl. in stock returns 0.9410 1.1210
(0.599) (0.743)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.1632 0.0770
(0.220) (0.908)
Common legal origin 0.2363* 0.1421
(0.122) (0.120)
Freedom in the host country 0.2143*** 0.2179*** 0.1873*** 0.1879***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
Constant -16.4221*** -15.8411*** -6.4588*** -8.2533***
(1.542) (0.843) (0.770) (0.955)
Observations 685 553 1,219 1,219
R-squared 0.906 0.926 0.906 0.567
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade -0.0234 1.7029*** 0.0789 0.2712***
(0.345) (0.419) (0.048) (0.087)
Log distance -1.5258*** -0.0665 -0.3278**
(0.549) (0.105) (0.155)
Time difference -0.0966 -0.0470** -0.0282
(0.086) (0.019) (0.025)
Common language 0.4079 -0.0773 -0.0571 0.1305
(0.511) (0.568) (0.125) (0.167)
Colony dummy 1.8632** 0.8779 1.0340*** 0.9527***
(0.818) (0.886) (0.248) (0.283)
Tax treaty 0.5327 -0.0321 0.0422 0.0989
(0.402) (0.444) (0.107) (0.145)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0747 -0.0761 0.1947 0.3658*
(0.831) (0.900) (0.159) (0.214)
Correl. in stock returns 0.5822 5.6551*
(1.806) (2.917)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -1.5347 0.3453
(0.979) (1.997)
Common legal origin 0.6566 -0.4879
(0.405) (0.468)
Freedom in the host country 0.1352** -0.0238 0.0578*** 0.0557***
(0.067) (0.084) (0.011) (0.016)
Constant -1.9341 -9.2153* -9.2420*** -7.7143***
(5.566) (5.484) (1.155) (1.573)
Observations 176 160 483 483
R-squared 0.830 0.811 0.780 0.520
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 5: Year 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.4162*** 0.7617*** 0.0609 0.1615***
(0.104) (0.117) (0.043) (0.055)
Log distance -0.1174 -0.7684*** -0.7165***
(0.155) (0.087) (0.096)
Time difference -0.0774*** 0.0662*** 0.0366**
(0.028) (0.017) (0.018)
Common language 0.3106* 0.1663 0.2086* 0.3951***
(0.175) (0.192) (0.108) (0.120)
Colony dummy 0.5999** 0.6665** 0.3874** 0.7702***
(0.269) (0.289) (0.175) (0.183)
Tax treaty -0.0048 0.0619 -0.0976 0.0308
(0.139) (0.150) (0.085) (0.094)
Currency union dummy 0.1851 -0.0814 0.8085*** 0.4768***
(0.221) (0.241) (0.172) (0.171)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.2530 0.4340** -0.0463 0.2229*
(0.197) (0.218) (0.117) (0.129)
Correl. in stock returns 1.6040** 2.6438**
(0.665) (1.038)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.3043 -0.8312
(0.237) (0.860)
Common legal origin 0.4004*** 0.2331
(0.130) (0.147)
Freedom in the host country 0.3800*** 0.1318*** 0.1444*** 0.1719***
(0.035) (0.023) (0.009) (0.011)
Constant -27.3493*** -12.8903*** -3.7271*** -5.5259***
(1.902) (1.345) (0.974) (1.128)
Observations 838 706 1,752 1,752
R-squared 0.874 0.869 0.769 0.478
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.4859*** 0.6793*** 0.1387*** 0.3013***
(0.098) (0.100) (0.044) (0.056)
Log distance 0.0126 -0.5455*** -0.4306***
(0.145) (0.094) (0.103)
Time difference -0.0363 0.0363** 0.0295
(0.027) (0.018) (0.020)
Common language 0.4397*** 0.2155 0.3699*** 0.4265***
(0.161) (0.176) (0.103) (0.120)
Colony dummy 0.1751 0.2754 0.2289 0.5410***
(0.241) (0.258) (0.155) (0.171)
Tax treaty -0.1124 -0.0844 -0.1978** -0.0684
(0.127) (0.134) (0.080) (0.090)
Currency union dummy 0.6704*** 0.6491*** -0.0780 0.3798**
(0.192) (0.216) (0.152) (0.154)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0461 0.0615 0.0165 -0.0002
(0.182) (0.199) (0.116) (0.131)
Correl. in stock returns -0.2876 -1.8099*
(0.646) (1.056)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.0474 0.4697
(0.228) (0.815)
Common legal origin 0.2752** 0.1852
(0.119) (0.137)
Freedom in the host country 0.3329*** 0.2048*** 0.1877*** 0.1957***
(0.026) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011)
Constant -24.3458*** -15.1709*** -8.0066*** -9.9832***
(1.440) (1.071) (0.977) (1.154)
Observations 653 531 1,205 1,205
R-squared 0.912 0.906 0.893 0.579
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1912 1.5665*** 0.0537
(0.348) (0.422) (0.055)
Log distance -1.1795** -0.0403
(0.586) (0.116)
Time difference -0.1137 -0.0696***
(0.096) (0.020)
Common language 0.6224 0.0997 0.1073
(0.531) (0.585) (0.141)
Colony dummy 2.1015** 1.4470 1.3656***
(0.861) (0.877) (0.273)
Tax treaty 0.0304 -0.4540 -0.0905
(0.451) (0.482) (0.118)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 1.0727 1.1699 0.0679
(0.883) (0.947) (0.152)
Correl. in stock returns 1.3908 7.2659*
(2.293) (3.775)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.8449 -0.8618
(0.956) (2.268)
Common legal origin 0.5086 -0.0233
(0.417) (0.470)
Freedom in the host country 0.2462*** 0.0422 0.0566**
(0.091) (0.080) (0.026)
Constant -12.1723* -13.2368** -9.1677***
(6.652) (5.388) (2.054)
Observations 185 175 547
R-squared 0.796 0.779 0.692
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 6: Year 2003
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.4661*** 0.7371*** 0.0357
(0.095) (0.112) (0.036)
Log distance -0.0598 -0.7664***
(0.146) (0.075)
Time difference -0.0468* 0.0590***
(0.026) (0.015)
Common language 0.2598* 0.1117 0.2347**
(0.157) (0.162) (0.091)
Colony dummy 0.2819 0.3767 0.2486
(0.252) (0.256) (0.157)
Tax treaty 0.0504 0.1073 -0.1624**
(0.138) (0.138) (0.077)
Currency union dummy 0.2962 0.1605 0.6152***
(0.203) (0.209) (0.152)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.0541 0.1723 0.1830*
(0.163) (0.176) (0.096)
Correl. in stock returns 1.5809** 1.0516
(0.650) (1.097)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.2876 0.4029
(0.237) (0.443)
Common legal origin 0.3640*** 0.1990
(0.118) (0.130)
Freedom in the host country 0.1796*** 0.1481*** 0.1936***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
Constant -12.4329*** -12.8113*** -6.7336***
(1.392) (0.999) (0.940)
Observations 945 812 2,149
R-squared 0.887 0.888 0.783
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.4434*** 0.5577*** 0.0957**
(0.089) (0.100) (0.037)
Log distance 0.0940 -0.5088***
(0.136) (0.084)
Time difference -0.0357 0.0260
(0.025) (0.017)
Common language 0.3057** 0.1515 0.2336***
(0.144) (0.144) (0.088)
Colony dummy -0.0515 0.0648 0.2361
(0.226) (0.220) (0.144)
Tax treaty -0.1486 -0.0878 -0.1381*
(0.127) (0.123) (0.074)
Currency union dummy 0.5137*** 0.4620*** -0.2287*
(0.177) (0.176) (0.139)
Correl. in idyosincratic GDP -0.0894 0.0316 0.3269***
(0.150) (0.155) (0.094)
Correl. in stock returns -0.0720 -1.4431
(0.643) (1.156)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.3616 -0.6455
(0.231) (0.392)
Common legal origin 0.3512*** 0.2918**
(0.107) (0.115)
Freedom in the host country 0.4690*** 0.1954*** 0.2142***
(0.031) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant -34.9817*** -13.1577*** -9.7160***
(1.543) (0.805) (0.912)
Observations 737 613 1,571
R-squared 0.921 0.921 0.884
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.0291 1.6076*** 0.0515
(0.310) (0.387) (0.052)
Log distance -0.9311* -0.1068
(0.531) (0.118)
Time difference -0.1581* -0.0708***
(0.087) (0.020)
Common language 0.7849 0.7725 0.0777
(0.496) (0.570) (0.137)
Colony dummy 1.9949** 1.2394 1.0391***
(0.791) (0.875) (0.262)
Tax treaty 0.5127 0.4211 -0.0707
(0.437) (0.488) (0.117)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1632 -0.0890 -0.0148
(0.771) (0.912) (0.145)
Correl. in stock returns -0.0536 -0.4369
(2.128) (3.642)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.5129 4.2035*
(1.004) (2.312)
Common legal origin 0.4880 -0.2311
(0.382) (0.447)
Freedom in the host country 0.3232*** 0.0293 0.0736***
(0.087) (0.101) (0.027)
Constant -23.0263*** -14.7201** -9.5031***
(6.513) (7.168) (2.115)
Observations 208 199 578
R-squared 0.802 0.750 0.706
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 7: Year 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3584*** 0.6519*** 0.0141
(0.090) (0.093) (0.034)
Log distance 0.0585 -0.7234***
(0.139) (0.070)
Time difference -0.0981*** 0.0561***
(0.024) (0.014)
Common language 0.3553** 0.2379 0.1813**
(0.153) (0.156) (0.085)
Colony dummy 0.5243** 0.5312** 0.2980*
(0.242) (0.248) (0.156)
Tax treaty 0.0794 0.1694 -0.0183
(0.136) (0.136) (0.075)
Currency union dummy 0.3882* 0.4043** 0.8027***
(0.199) (0.200) (0.151)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.0645 0.1009 0.2311**
(0.161) (0.168) (0.094)
Correl. in stock returns 1.4197** 0.8976
(0.620) (0.907)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.0170 0.4032
(0.231) (0.377)
Common legal origin 0.3646*** 0.2381**
(0.113) (0.119)
Freedom in the host country 0.2098*** 0.1784*** 0.1917***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant -14.6276*** -14.6393*** -7.3998***
(1.346) (0.857) (0.935)
Observations 1,009 883 2,280
R-squared 0.880 0.885 0.768
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.2929*** 0.4756*** 0.1346***
(0.087) (0.088) (0.036)
Log distance 0.0638 -0.3412***
(0.132) (0.079)
Time difference -0.0598** 0.0095
(0.024) (0.015)
Common language 0.4159*** 0.2702* 0.2329***
(0.144) (0.141) (0.081)
Colony dummy 0.0820 0.1343 0.1491
(0.219) (0.215) (0.139)
Tax treaty -0.0442 0.0868 -0.1982***
(0.130) (0.124) (0.074)
Currency union dummy 0.6319*** 0.7148*** -0.0707
(0.176) (0.171) (0.134)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0769 -0.1354 0.2275**
(0.153) (0.152) (0.093)
Correl. in stock returns 0.1782 -0.5625
(0.629) (1.027)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.7894*** -0.7003**
(0.233) (0.330)
Common legal origin 0.3834*** 0.3277***
(0.106) (0.108)
Freedom in the host country 0.2467*** 0.2348*** 0.2023***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant -16.4351*** -16.5112*** -10.8151***
(1.274) (0.799) (0.871)
Observations 754 642 1,519
R-squared 0.912 0.916 0.893
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1738 1.4530*** 0.0321
(0.247) (0.264) (0.043)
Log distance -0.3992 -0.0855
(0.470) (0.099)
Time difference -0.1665** -0.0685***
(0.069) (0.018)
Common language 0.5741 0.6561 0.0186
(0.433) (0.471) (0.115)
Colony dummy 2.1697*** 1.3911* 1.4782***
(0.723) (0.782) (0.242)
Tax treaty 0.4310 0.2137 0.0175
(0.365) (0.398) (0.099)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.4821 0.6680 0.0144
(0.543) (0.606) (0.122)
Correl. in stock returns 1.2298 -1.3172
(1.676) (2.281)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 1.1885 3.8755**
(0.795) (1.750)
Common legal origin 0.3057 -0.1907
(0.310) (0.345)
Freedom in the host country 0.1904*** 0.0798* 0.0778***
(0.048) (0.043) (0.025)
Constant -17.2515*** -18.4813*** -10.0855***
(3.563) (3.193) (1.954)
Observations 255 241 761
R-squared 0.802 0.768 0.665
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved)
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Table 8: Year 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2899*** 0.8006*** 0.0701**
(0.090) (0.088) (0.031)
Log distance -0.1441 -0.6599***
(0.141) (0.067)
Time difference -0.0982*** 0.0459***
(0.025) (0.013)
Common language 0.3058* 0.2790* 0.1835**
(0.158) (0.163) (0.080)
Colony dummy 0.3310 0.1038 0.4456***
(0.253) (0.259) (0.153)
Tax treaty 0.4234*** 0.4834*** -0.1244*
(0.141) (0.142) (0.072)
Currency union dummy 0.4500** 0.2991 0.6067***
(0.206) (0.210) (0.142)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1402 0.0189 0.3654***
(0.168) (0.176) (0.085)
Correl. in stock returns 1.0510* 0.4417
(0.627) (0.804)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.1126 -0.3131
(0.240) (0.456)
Common legal origin 0.5060*** 0.3172***
(0.117) (0.122)
Freedom in the host country 0.2169*** 0.1668*** 0.1832***
(0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Constant -13.1043*** -14.9854*** -7.5956***
(1.401) (0.839) (0.814)
Observations 1,020 1,001 2,314
R-squared 0.880 0.877 0.797
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.2907*** 0.5525*** 0.0740** 0.2522***
(0.094) (0.088) (0.031) (0.047)
Log distance -0.0667 -0.4698*** -0.3407***
(0.146) (0.072) (0.093)
Time difference -0.0504* 0.0315** 0.0106
(0.028) (0.014) (0.019)
Common language 0.3186** 0.3269** 0.1933** 0.3781***
(0.160) (0.163) (0.077) (0.104)
Colony dummy -0.0060 -0.1125 0.3232** 0.4099**
(0.245) (0.244) (0.139) (0.166)
Tax treaty 0.1148 0.1935 -0.1069 -0.0129
(0.145) (0.143) (0.071) (0.091)
Currency union dummy 0.7537*** 0.7645*** 0.0102 0.2514*
(0.193) (0.198) (0.129) (0.142)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.2318 -0.2040 0.2541*** 0.1633
(0.172) (0.171) (0.088) (0.107)
Correl. in stock returns -0.3084 -1.0299
(0.672) (0.875)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.9122*** -0.6030
(0.263) (0.511)
Common legal origin 0.3892*** 0.2579**
(0.117) (0.120)
Freedom in the host country 0.2507*** 0.2303*** 0.2040*** 0.1929***
(0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant -15.5273*** -16.6838*** -9.7894*** -10.6346***
(1.431) (0.796) (0.818) (0.989)
Observations 751 735 1,649 1,649
R-squared 0.904 0.905 0.895 0.571
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1318 1.3029*** 0.1120**
(0.204) (0.206) (0.051)
Log distance -0.9979** -0.1173
(0.391) (0.111)
Time difference -0.0824 -0.0742***
(0.058) (0.020)
Common language 0.2822 0.0554 0.1502
(0.388) (0.417) (0.129)
Colony dummy 1.8029*** 1.3465** 1.4101***
(0.628) (0.672) (0.276)
Tax treaty 1.0901*** 0.7468** -0.0944
(0.318) (0.347) (0.115)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0879 0.1606 -0.1085
(0.477) (0.515) (0.130)
Correl. in stock returns 1.3068 1.9397
(1.397) (1.810)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.3780 0.4628
(0.690) (1.256)
Common legal origin 0.6823** 0.3828
(0.276) (0.303)
Freedom in the host country 0.1788*** 0.0527 0.1002***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.028)
Constant -10.4018*** -14.5643*** -10.5045***
(2.955) (2.116) (2.122)
Observations 269 266 665
R-squared 0.839 0.813 0.682
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 9: Year 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2701*** 0.9244*** 0.0467* 0.3196***
(0.085) (0.083) (0.027) (0.040)
Log distance -0.3527*** -0.7342*** -0.4931***
(0.133) (0.061) (0.073)
Time difference -0.0756*** 0.0586*** 0.0116
(0.024) (0.012) (0.014)
Common language 0.1607 0.1415 0.1600** 0.3414***
(0.151) (0.159) (0.078) (0.089)
Colony dummy 0.5546** 0.2875 0.4531*** 0.4590***
(0.243) (0.250) (0.145) (0.148)
Tax treaty 0.4189*** 0.4143*** 0.0084 0.0192
(0.135) (0.138) (0.068) (0.078)
Currency union dummy 0.5070** 0.4498** 0.8125*** 0.2539*
(0.199) (0.205) (0.139) (0.138)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.2073 -0.0539 0.3158*** 0.3819***
(0.156) (0.166) (0.078) (0.085)
Correl. in stock returns 1.0020 0.1356
(0.618) (0.734)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.0300 -0.2667
(0.237) (0.427)
Common legal origin 0.3467*** 0.1198
(0.111) (0.117)
Freedom in the host country 0.2165*** 0.1584*** 0.1798*** 0.2032***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant -11.1202*** -14.9162*** -5.7638*** -11.0984***
(1.362) (0.802) (0.830) (1.025)
Observations 1,061 1,040 2,504 2,504
R-squared 0.883 0.877 0.796 0.506
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3752*** 0.5291*** 0.1022*** 0.3525***
(0.083) (0.077) (0.028) (0.042)
Log distance -0.1558 -0.5437*** -0.2718***
(0.128) (0.066) (0.083)
Time difference 0.0010 0.0311** 0.0142
(0.025) (0.013) (0.017)
Common language 0.1822 0.2223 0.1454** 0.2239**
(0.141) (0.143) (0.074) (0.092)
Colony dummy 0.2538 0.2237 0.4025*** 0.4310***
(0.214) (0.213) (0.125) (0.142)
Tax treaty 0.1654 0.2062 -0.1272* -0.1309
(0.130) (0.128) (0.067) (0.082)
Currency union dummy 0.7763*** 0.8284*** -0.0263 0.2129*
(0.171) (0.172) (0.120) (0.129)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1220 -0.1210 0.2157*** 0.0890
(0.151) (0.151) (0.081) (0.096)
Correl. in stock returns -0.0349 -0.4359
(0.607) (0.706)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.6767*** -0.7532**
(0.238) (0.380)
Common legal origin 0.1917* 0.1076
(0.103) (0.105)
Freedom in the host country 0.2341*** 0.2254*** 0.2232*** 0.2401***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011)
Constant -14.9243*** -16.6011*** -10.1492*** -15.5139***
(1.315) (0.700) (0.784) (1.092)
Observations 778 760 1,653 1,653
R-squared 0.918 0.920 0.910 0.579
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.0539 1.5358*** 0.0870**
(0.220) (0.215) (0.038)
Log distance -1.3600*** -0.1868*
(0.397) (0.096)
Time difference -0.0780 -0.0778***
(0.062) (0.018)
Common language 0.1129 -0.2263 0.3029**
(0.411) (0.450) (0.124)
Colony dummy 1.7502** 0.8833 1.1886***
(0.729) (0.787) (0.274)
Tax treaty 1.0340*** 0.7007* -0.1236
(0.333) (0.371) (0.101)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.0510 0.3880 -0.0721
(0.494) (0.532) (0.115)
Correl. in stock returns 1.7714 1.2479
(1.583) (1.937)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.5338 1.0670
(0.732) (1.595)
Common legal origin 0.3758 -0.0096
(0.292) (0.321)
Freedom in the host country 0.1705*** 0.0133 0.0747***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.015)
Constant -9.0083*** -11.2667*** -9.1996***
(3.365) (2.850) (1.469)
Observations 283 280 851
R-squared 0.805 0.768 0.635
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 10: Year 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.3839*** 0.8194*** 0.0595** 0.2575***
(0.085) (0.084) (0.026) (0.040)
Log distance -0.0112 -0.6663*** -0.5236***
(0.134) (0.059) (0.075)
Time difference -0.1112*** 0.0432*** 0.0171
(0.024) (0.012) (0.014)
Common language 0.4859*** 0.4608*** 0.2482*** 0.3683***
(0.153) (0.156) (0.071) (0.091)
Colony dummy 0.6103** 0.4061* 0.5027*** 0.5720***
(0.242) (0.246) (0.133) (0.149)
Tax treaty 0.4028*** 0.4182*** 0.0038 0.1748**
(0.137) (0.138) (0.064) (0.079)
Currency union dummy 0.4241** 0.3123 0.4444*** 0.2810**
(0.203) (0.206) (0.132) (0.141)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1140 -0.0469 0.3481*** 0.3161***
(0.157) (0.162) (0.072) (0.086)
Correl. in stock returns 1.1834* 0.7745
(0.615) (0.690)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.0863 -0.3465
(0.242) (0.462)
Common legal origin 0.1288 -0.0604
(0.112) (0.116)
Freedom in the host country 0.2399*** 0.1942*** 0.1860*** 0.2038***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.008) (0.010)
Constant -17.1033*** -17.6911*** -8.0023*** -11.1694***
Observations 1,098 1,098 2,640 2,640
R-squared 0.879 0.874 0.803 0.490
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3780*** 0.4170*** 0.0769*** 0.3127***
(0.080) (0.076) (0.028) (0.044)
Log distance -0.0779 -0.4523*** -0.2642***
(0.123) (0.067) (0.086)
Time difference 0.0132 0.0281** 0.0230
(0.024) (0.013) (0.017)
Common language 0.4197*** 0.4291*** 0.2411*** 0.3295***
(0.138) (0.139) (0.073) (0.098)
Colony dummy 0.1914 0.1805 0.4847*** 0.5593***
(0.207) (0.207) (0.127) (0.149)
Tax treaty 0.0854 0.0698 -0.0766 0.1226
(0.129) (0.127) (0.068) (0.085)
Currency union dummy 0.7553*** 0.7640*** -0.2097* 0.2192
(0.168) (0.168) (0.124) (0.134)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1108 -0.0980 0.2280*** 0.0983
(0.149) (0.149) (0.082) (0.100)
Correl. in stock returns 0.6675 0.5288
(0.590) (0.647)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.3428 -0.3618
(0.235) (0.404)
Common legal origin 0.0897 0.0821
(0.101) (0.103)
Freedom in the host country 0.2417*** 0.2407*** 0.2207*** 0.2313***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
Constant -16.9970*** -17.7180*** -11.7857*** -15.4801***
Observations 791 791 1,808 1,808
R-squared 0.921 0.920 0.892 0.577
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3442 1.8054*** 0.1223***
(0.235) (0.262) (0.043)
Log distance -0.6778 -0.1686*
(0.417) (0.101)
Time difference -0.1800*** -0.0875***
(0.066) (0.019)
Common language 0.8659** 0.7317 0.2266*
(0.431) (0.473) (0.124)
Colony dummy 1.9580*** 1.1457 1.0296***
(0.724) (0.792) (0.249)
Tax treaty 0.6330* 0.3559 -0.0941
(0.351) (0.397) (0.102)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.0710 0.8517 0.0782
(0.529) (0.580) (0.119)
Correl. in stock returns 0.9361 -1.6053
(1.692) (2.096)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.2058 3.2853
(0.868) (2.157)
Common legal origin -0.0021 -0.5083
(0.299) (0.334)
Freedom in the host country 0.2332*** 0.1581** 0.0557***
(0.067) (0.073) (0.019)
Constant -21.4053*** -21.2140*** -6.9054***
Observations 307 307 832
R-squared 0.791 0.744 0.684
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 11: Year 2008
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2984*** 0.8923*** 0.0550**
(0.098) (0.089) (0.027)
Log distance -0.2819* -0.7089***
(0.150) (0.064)
Time difference -0.0805*** 0.0617***
(0.027) (0.013)
Common language 0.0797 0.0608 0.2817***
(0.172) (0.177) (0.079)
Colony dummy 0.5036* 0.3284 0.4917***
(0.269) (0.273) (0.148)
Tax treaty 0.2702 0.3027* -0.1423**
(0.166) (0.167) (0.069)
Currency union dummy 0.4657** 0.3174 0.5238***
(0.224) (0.230) (0.141)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0737 0.0107 0.5053***
(0.174) (0.180) (0.077)
Correl. in stock returns 1.1128 0.6539
(0.784) (0.881)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.2344 0.4908
(0.299) (0.507)
Common legal origin 0.3440*** 0.0812
(0.127) (0.133)
Freedom in the host country 0.2419*** 0.1883*** 0.1776***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.012)
Constant -14.3707*** -17.7506*** -7.2943***
(1.572) (1.084) (0.836)
Observations 915 915 2,207
R-squared 0.882 0.876 0.792
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1534 0.5111*** 0.0414
(0.098) (0.087) (0.031)
Log distance -0.4442*** -0.5591***
(0.156) (0.076)
Time difference 0.0222 0.0297**
(0.030) (0.014)
Common language 0.1660 0.1787 0.2104**
(0.175) (0.177) (0.084)
Colony dummy -0.0463 -0.1366 0.5469***
(0.257) (0.259) (0.142)
Tax treaty 0.0126 -0.0421 -0.1033
(0.181) (0.179) (0.077)
Currency union dummy 0.7972*** 0.7693*** -0.2227*
(0.201) (0.205) (0.132)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0985 -0.0679 0.3439***
(0.180) (0.182) (0.088)
Correl. in stock returns 0.0875 -0.1198
(0.860) (0.967)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -0.3838 0.1645
(0.312) (0.468)
Common legal origin 0.2658** 0.1518
(0.127) (0.130)
Freedom in the host country 0.2625*** 0.2339*** 0.2179***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.013)
Constant -13.2398*** -17.5053*** -10.5045***
(1.572) (0.990) (0.877)
Observations 652 652 1,430
R-squared 0.911 0.908 0.891
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.5672** 1.7597*** 0.1272***
(0.264) (0.263) (0.038)
Log distance -0.4292 -0.1235
(0.409) (0.096)
Time difference -0.1473** -0.0682***
(0.071) (0.018)
Common language -0.3748 -0.4205 0.4418***
(0.418) (0.437) (0.114)
Colony dummy 2.1288*** 1.8365** 0.9180***
(0.692) (0.736) (0.259)
Tax treaty 0.3625 0.0572 -0.2660***
(0.394) (0.429) (0.099)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.2785 0.1635 0.0977
(0.609) (0.625) (0.113)
Correl. in stock returns 0.6321 0.8016
(1.834) (2.182)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.6639 -0.5080
(1.007) (2.058)
Common legal origin 0.3638 -0.1150
(0.311) (0.336)
Freedom in the host country 0.2574*** 0.1456** 0.1143***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.018)
Constant -22.3106*** -22.4495*** -11.2831***
(4.760) (4.687) (1.596)
Observations 263 263 777
R-squared 0.808 0.788 0.683
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 12: Year 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel FE Panel IV Panel FE Tobit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.4026*** 0.7348*** 0.0967*** 0.2683***
(0.102) (0.082) (0.033) (0.047)
Log distance -0.1423 -0.5763*** -0.4292***
(0.148) (0.074) (0.086)
Time difference -0.0560** 0.0340** 0.0098
(0.028) (0.015) (0.017)
Common language 0.2519 0.2434 0.3110*** 0.4717***
(0.169) (0.170) (0.093) (0.105)
Colony dummy 0.7584** 0.6345** 0.6141*** 0.6791***
(0.298) (0.296) (0.175) (0.184)
Tax treaty 0.2371 0.2453 -0.1142 0.1135
(0.167) (0.165) (0.083) (0.093)
Currency union dummy 0.6166*** 0.5457** 0.5015*** 0.3431**
(0.219) (0.221) (0.154) (0.155)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.2455 -0.2228 0.4738*** 0.4396***
(0.178) (0.180) (0.089) (0.096)
Correl. in stock returns 3.2647*** 2.8809***
(0.860) (0.982)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.3918 0.2662
(0.359) (0.466)
Common legal origin 0.1094 -0.0368
(0.128) (0.129)
Freedom in the host country 0.1631*** 0.1421*** 0.2046*** 0.2482***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.009) (0.013)
Constant -11.2190*** -13.6829*** -9.4660*** -14.5717***
(1.712) (1.180) (0.907) (1.277)
Observations 863 863 1,983 1,983
R-squared 0.883 0.881 0.804 0.477
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3049*** 0.3389*** 0.0625 0.3171***
(0.089) (0.074) (0.038) (0.054)
Log distance -0.1439 -0.5796*** -0.3224***
(0.129) (0.092) (0.104)
Time difference 0.0398 0.0353* 0.0329
(0.027) (0.019) (0.021)
Common language 0.2195 0.2478* 0.2428** 0.2361**
(0.146) (0.146) (0.104) (0.119)
Colony dummy 0.0828 0.0657 0.5981*** 0.7269***
(0.244) (0.242) (0.181) (0.188)
Tax treaty 0.0535 0.0220 -0.0175 0.1864*
(0.157) (0.155) (0.100) (0.109)
Currency union dummy 0.8581*** 0.8894*** 0.0336 0.2176
(0.173) (0.175) (0.160) (0.153)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1693 -0.1533 0.4553*** 0.2364**
(0.159) (0.158) (0.111) (0.117)
Correl. in stock returns 2.2800*** 1.8032**
(0.785) (0.898)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. 0.1290 0.3574
(0.362) (0.479)
Common legal origin 0.1342 0.1405
(0.110) (0.110)
Freedom in the host country 0.1634*** 0.1697*** 0.1792*** 0.1852***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Constant -10.7404*** -12.1241*** -6.6766*** -10.5513***
(1.458) (0.945) (0.985) (1.129)
Observations 626 626 1,343 1,343
R-squared 0.923 0.922 0.866 0.556
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.7951*** 1.5162*** 0.1256**
(0.291) (0.264) (0.053)
Log distance -0.6409 -0.1424
(0.475) (0.115)
Time difference -0.0403 -0.0861***
(0.076) (0.021)
Common language 0.2017 0.1179 0.3751**
(0.480) (0.482) (0.149)
Colony dummy 2.6578*** 2.1711** 1.3271***
(0.875) (0.874) (0.328)
Tax treaty 0.1666 -0.0289 -0.0356
(0.414) (0.439) (0.121)
Currency union dummy 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP 0.2792 0.4289 0.0394
(0.583) (0.590) (0.131)
Correl. in stock returns 4.3541* 4.8537*
(2.331) (2.731)
Correl. Growth-stock ret. -1.5450 -1.7473
(1.198) (1.885)
Common legal origin -0.3528 -0.4616
(0.356) (0.356)
Freedom in the host country 0.1741*** 0.1148* 0.1161***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.031)
Constant -17.9775*** -25.5616*** -12.0097***
(5.087) (4.543) (2.346)
Observations 237 237 640
R-squared 0.797 0.790 0.713
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: equity holdings of source country i in host country j (xij) measured in tens of billion of U.S. dollars
Exchange rate variability and valuation effects taken into account as illustrated in section 3
Estimated equation from columns (1) to (4): log(xij) = φi + φj + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
When no estimates are reported for the Tobit model it means that convergence has been not achieved
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Table 16: 2001-2009 Panel estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Panel FE Panel FE Tobit Tobit Probit Probit
Full Sample
Log bilateral trade 0.2861*** 0.3185*** 0.7586*** 0.7754*** 0.0457*** 0.0469***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.2972*** -0.3309*** -0.2715*** -0.1924*** -0.0073 -0.0011
(0.086) (0.087) (0.051) (0.050) (0.009) (0.009)
Tax treaty 0.0061 0.0034 0.2949*** 0.3860*** 0.0987*** 0.1004***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.038) (0.038) (0.006) (0.006)
Correl. in stock returns -0.7227** -0.7632*** 5.1106*** 4.3438*** 0.4401*** 0.3837***
(0.282) (0.281) (0.096) (0.103) (0.016) (0.016)
Correl. growth-stock return 0.2148 0.2235* 0.1051* 0.1910*** -0.0300*** -0.0252***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.055) (0.054) (0.007) (0.007)
Freedom in the host country 0.0279*** 0.0327*** 0.0024***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -5.7550*** -7.7373*** -8.5580*** -10.4575***
(0.184) (0.492) (0.065) (0.131)
Observations 10835 10835 13229 13229 13438 13438
R-squared 0.094 0.097 0.219 0.225 0.343 0.348
OECD countries
Log bilateral trade 0.3069*** 0.3229*** 0.7664*** 0.7945*** 0.0217*** 0.0220***
(0.060) (0.059) (0.011) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.1574** -0.1813** -0.1492*** -0.0666 0.0020 0.0032
(0.079) (0.081) (0.058) (0.056) (0.007) (0.007)
Tax treaty 0.0897 0.0874 0.0750 0.2750*** 0.0446*** 0.0469***
(0.088) (0.088) (0.046) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005)
Correl. in stock returns -0.8968*** -0.9204*** 5.3078*** 4.0995*** 0.2869*** 0.2623***
(0.302) (0.303) (0.105) (0.116) (0.012) (0.013)
Correl. growth-stock return 0.3220** 0.3297** 0.4185*** 0.4714*** -0.0235*** -0.0229***
(0.153) (0.153) (0.059) (0.058) (0.005) (0.005)
Freedom in the host country 0.0119* 0.0433*** 0.0008***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.000)
Constant -4.9823*** -5.8219*** -7.9142*** -10.6443***
(0.208) (0.496) (0.071) (0.146)
Observations 7567 7567 8623 8623 8766 8766
R-squared 0.109 0.110 0.253 0.264 0.363 0.364
Emerging countries
Log bilateral trade 0.1776 0.2269** 0.6061*** 0.6114*** 0.0967*** 0.1003***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004)
Correl. in idiosyncratic GDP -0.0198 0.1247 -0.5364*** -0.4206*** -0.0336 -0.0063
(0.307) (0.305) (0.067) (0.066) (0.022) (0.022)
Tax treaty -0.2240 -0.2123 -0.1162** -0.1291*** 0.1720*** 0.1558***
(0.224) (0.224) (0.047) (0.046) (0.014) (0.014)
Correl. in stock returns 0.6294 0.4688 2.7916*** 2.2589*** 0.6493*** 0.5280***
(0.559) (0.553) (0.143) (0.145) (0.044) (0.045)
Correl. growth-stock return -0.2281 -0.2965 -0.1713** -0.0042 -0.0126 0.0189
(0.259) (0.261) (0.080) (0.080) (0.021) (0.021)
Freedom in the host country 0.0702*** 0.0325*** 0.0075***
(0.018) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant -7.8598*** -12.8549*** -8.4242*** -10.7188***
(0.342) (1.320) (0.096) (0.183)
Observations 3268 3268 4606 4606 4672 4672
R-squared 0.135 0.141 0.195 0.207 0.332 0.349
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated equations: log(xij) = φij + βZij + ij
Dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is: log(xij + 0.001)
Dependent variable in regressions (5) and (6) is a binary variable taking value 1 if xij > 0 and zero otherwise
Columns (5) and (6) report marginal effects
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Table 17: Degree of risk sharing versus correlation of idyiosincratic GDP
A) All shocks B) Positive shocks C) Negative shocks
OECD OECD OECD
Inflows Inflows Inflows
Correlation coefficient -0.07 -0.05 -0.01
[0.76] [0.82] [0.95]
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient -0.03 -0.05 -0.18
[0.91] [0.82] [0.42]
Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient -0.03 -0.04 -0.11
[0.87] [0.82] [0.50]
country avg corr GDP id %risk shared %risk shared %risk shared
TUR -0.13 5.16 12.10 2.40
CHL -0.07 -0.10 4.57 -2.59
ISR -0.03 -0.95 0.02 -1.58
ISL 0.05 -15.32 -19.67 -11.19
US 0.09 -5.89 -3.30 -7.99
CHE 0.10 -5.67 -9.89 -3.27
AUS 0.12 -8.44 -41.06 -1.30
KOR 0.13 0.29 2.17 -0.58
IRL 0.15 -19.79 20.14 -80.91
NLD 0.17 16.14 9.48 24.69
GBR 0.19 19.33 24.69 17.73
SWE 0.19 -11.60 1.22 -18.64
FIN 0.20 -3.47 4.32 -6.19
NOR 0.25 -6.91 -13.88 -3.66
DNK 0.28 -0.21 1.78 -1.55
AUT 0.34 3.88 1.33 5.31
GER 0.36 -0.47 4.22 -6.23
CAN 0.36 -4.61 -10.72 -0.71
ITA 0.40 -1.41 5.75 -6.26
FRA 0.40 -14.70 -14.98 -14.58
PRT 0.43 0.11 6.91 -5.26
ESP 0.48 -5.27 -5.18 -5.33
A) All shocks B) Positive shocks C) Negative shocks
EMU EMU EMU
Inflows Inflows Inflows
Correlation coefficient -0.47 -0.75 0.19
[0.20] [0.02] [0.62]
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient -0.43 -0.83 -0.07
[0.24] [0.01] [0.86]
Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient -0.33 -0.67 -0.11
[0.25] [0.02] [0.75]
country avg corr GDP id %risk shared %risk shared %risk shared
IRL 0.15 -13.38 20.71 -61.61
NLD 0.17 26.62 66.82 1.69
FIN 0.20 -1.28 12.27 -4.87
AUT 0.34 10.78 24.22 -5.11
GER 0.36 -2.43 14.37 -23.15
ITA 0.40 -20.78 -21.59 -20.43
FRA 0.40 -34.77 -24.79 -39.99
PRT 0.43 0.78 11.20 -5.10
ESP 0.48 -15.83 -35.81 -7.99
Significance values in parentheses.
The degree of risk sharing considered refers only to income inflows from abroad.
A negative sign for % risk shared means a dis-smoothing effect of asset income inflows from abroad
GDP id stands for idiosyncratic GDP growth rate calculated as explained in appendix B.
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